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Abstract
We investigate the effects of heterogeneity,  incomplete information and communication on
aggregate contributions to a public good using the voluntary contribution mechanism in a non-
linear laboratory environment.    One-dimensional heterogeneity (heterogeneity in income or
preferences) and two-dimensional heterogeneity (heterogeneity in income and preferences) both
increase voluntary contributions.  The effect is greatest when information is incomplete in the
sense that subjects do not know each other’s payoffs.  Incomplete information also reduces
contributions in the homogeneous case. Communication reverses the relative importance of one-
and two-dimensional heterogeneity in promoting cooperation.  
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HETEROGENEITY AND THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
I. INTRODUCTION
Bardhan (1993) suggests that “cooperation works better in small groups with similarity of
needs...” but that “an increase in the disparity in private benefits from [the public good] can lead
to a situation in which some parties may lose from cooperation...”  This view is supported by
Kanbur (1992) who argues that cooperation in the management of common property resources is
less likely to come about when agents are highly heterogeneous.  In his formal analysis
heterogeneity is introduced in agents’ benefit functions.
In a different model of common property resource management, Hackett (1992) finds that
heterogeneity in costs of appropriation complicates efficient governance structures, and leads to
less coordination than when costs are more homogeneous or when side-payments between agents
are permitted.  Ostrom (1992) comments on the importance of homogeneity of social and
individual capital for people to succeed in crafting governance institutions and Olson (1983)
suggests that homogeneity in preferences and income may “increase welfare and reduce conflict”
within the context of the formation of jurisdictions or clubs which provide public goods.
A contrary view is presented in work by Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira (1985), Marwell,
Oliver, and Prahl (1988) and Heckathorn (1993), who study heterogeneity and public good
provision in complex environments.  They provide scenarios in which the impact of heterogeneity
in preferences and incomes may lead to increases in collective action.  Generally the intuition
behind these results is that in many situations heterogeneous groups increase the likelihood of a     
1  The cases in which heterogeneity leads to increased contributions are consistent with a
notion of critical mass.  In these environments income distribution is so skewed that one
individual has sufficient resources and incentive to invest in the public good and the equilibrium
contributions are greater than the equilibrium contributions in the environment in which each
individual has the same income and each individual contributes a small amount to public good
provision.
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critical mass of individuals who will contribute to the public good.  With an increased likelihood
of the good being provided, more individuals will contribute.  The models used are complex and
numerical simulation is used to generate results for alternative parameter specifications.   
It is possible to study the impact of different incomes and different returns to public good
consumption when public goods are provided through voluntary contributions in a laboratory
environment.  Isaac and Walker (1988) and Hackett, Schlager, and Walker (1994) show that
heterogeneity in income reduces voluntary contributions to public goods when agents can
communicate prior to making contribution decisions.   When communication is not permitted, 
Hackett, Schlager and Walker find a positive and significant influence of heterogeneity.  Similarly,
Chan,  Mestelman, Moir, and Muller (1996) find evidence that sufficiently large dispersion in
income results in increased contributions.
1  The Chan et al. outcomes are predicted by the
conventional public goods model (unlike the heterogeneity effects observed by Isaac and Walker
and Hackett, Schlager, and Walker which are not consistent with the conventional theory).  The
effect of heterogeneity in preferences (payoff to public good provision) has not been studied in the
laboratory.
In naturally occurring environments, public goods frequently are provided by groups of
individuals who are able to communicate.  The provision of resources to an irrigation project by
farmers in a region, the provision of resources for the construction of a marina by sailors in a     
2 Within the context of the conventional model, without side-payments or costly coercion and
regardless of the information condition, communication should have no effect on voluntary
contributions.
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community, and the provision of resources for the purchase of airplanes by members of a flying
club are examples of this kind of activity.  In these environments, however, it is impossible to
determine if provision is optimal or if the participants have simply found their way to a sub-
optimal equilibrium. Non-cooperative game theory predicts that non-binding communication
will have no effect on voluntary contributions.
2  Nevertheless, laboratory experiments have
demonstrated that communication improves coordination and leads to increases in voluntary
contributions even if the agreements made through communication are not enforced by the
experimenters.  Naturally occurring environments are also characterized by incomplete
information across participants regarding intensity of preference and income.  Although
information concerning income can be revealed and perhaps verified through communication,
information concerning preferences is neither easily transmitted nor verified.  Consequently,
studies of the effect of heterogeneity on voluntary contributions to public goods ought carefully to
account for communication and information effects.
This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment into the direction and nature of
the effect of heterogeneity on voluntary contributions to a public good under alternative
conditions of information and communication.  It distinguishes heterogeneity in incomes from
heterogeneity in preferences. It finds that heterogeneity in a single dimension (income or
preferences) has a strong  positive impact on public good provision  in environments characterized
by incomplete information and communication among agents.  Simultaneous heterogeneity in two




across agents, communication leads to significant increases in public good provision, but
heterogeneity has no significant impact.  These results suggest that small differences among
individuals may aid cooperation and coordination in the voluntary provision of public goods, but
that coordination may be reduced as differences become larger and more complex.
II. THE THEORETICAL MODEL
The public goods environment is similar to that introduced in Chan et al. (1996). 
Resources for the provision of public goods are voluntarily contributed by individuals who have a
specific endowment of resources at the start of each decision period.  Individuals can allocate
resources to activities which provide returns directly related to their own investment of resources
or they can allocate resources to activities which provide returns dependent upon the resources
allocated by the community.  Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) provide a rigorous
development of this environment in which public goods will be provided at sub-optimal levels.  
Following Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (BBV), individuals allocate their income to a
private consumption good and a collective consumption good.  On BBV's assumption of zero
conjectural variations, the individual must solve the problem
subject to the budget constraint  , the public goods identity  , and the xi % gi ’ wi G ’ G&i % gi
non-negativity constraint  .  Private good allocations are denoted by   and allocations to gi $ 0 xi     
3  See Theorems 3, 4, and 5 in Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986, 34-38).
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the collective good by  .    denotes group allocations to the collective good by all individuals, gi G
 denotes the allocations of all individuals except  , and   is the individual's income.  G&i i wi
   If the payoff to individual  ,  , is given by i ui
where   is a parameter which characterizes individual preferences for the public good, the best "i
response function for individual   is  i
In this environment BBV prove that there is a unique Nash equilibrium with following
properties: given tastes, richer individuals contribute more to the provision of the public good
than do poorer individuals; if the distribution of income is sufficiently unequal, very poor
individuals contribute nothing; redistribution of income among individuals who contribute a
positive amount both before and after the redistribution has no effect on the aggregate quantity of
the public good; redistribution of income from non-contributing individuals to contributing
individuals increases the aggregate quantity of the public good.
3-6-
In this environment, heterogeneity in preferences and income will have no effect on the
Nash equilibrium value of   if   and  , where   is the number of individuals G j
I
i’1
"i ’ " j
I
i’1
wi ’ W I
in the group and   is the income of the group.  Heterogeneity in preferences and income is W
introduced by setting some  s and  s different to others. "i wi
The parameterization of this model and the resulting equilibrium predictions are presented
in the next two sections.  Of particular note is that this model permits parameterizations in which
income distribution may be changed and the distribution of preferences may be changed without
affecting the equilibrium predictions for group voluntary contributions or group optimal
contributions, although individual contributions may vary.  This permits comparisons of the
impact of different treatments from a common base.  The introduction of this specific model can
guarantee that the introduction of heterogeneity does not lead to an environment in which
contributions will increase independent of communication and information treatments (as in two
of the cases presented in Chan et al., 1996).  This eliminates notions of critical mass as an
explanation of any positive effects of heterogeneity which may arise.
III. THE LABORATORY ENVIRONMENT
In the laboratory environment individuals were divided into groups of three.  Bardhan's
(1993) suggestion that small groups are more likely to coordinate successfully implies  that using
three-person groups allowing communication should increase the likelihood of  optimal voluntary
contributions regardless of the heterogeneity characteristics of the groups.  Any heterogeneity     
4  The payoff matrices reported the subjects’ payoffs in laboratory dollars as a function of the
subjects' allocations to Market 2 (the public good) and the group allocation of the other two
subjects to Market 2.  Because laboratory dollars had to be allocated to either Market 1 or
Market 2, the payoff matrix included the return to the residual which would be invested in Market
1.  All subjects had copies of their payoff matrices and the payoff matrices of the other members
in their group in complete information environments.  The subjects had a copy of their own payoff
matrices only in incomplete information environments.  The information conditions were clearly
described in the instructions.  Payoff matrices and instructions are available from the authors.
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effect will have to be strong if it is to be observed.  In each decision round,  individuals in each
group allocate their laboratory dollar (L$) endowments to Market 1 (a private good market) or to
Market 2 (a public good market). Allocations were restricted to integer values. Subjects reported
their decisions through a network of personal computers. 
There were two parts to each session.  The first part consisted of six decision rounds,
during which there was no communication among the subjects.  The second part consisted of
sixteen decisions rounds in which limited communication was permitted. Before the seventh,
eleventh, fifteenth, and nineteenth decision rounds the subjects had an opportunity to have face-
to-face communication (see Table 1).  Details of the communication that was permitted is
discussed below.    At the end of each decision round, individuals' payoffs in laboratory dollars
were calculated according to the function specified in equation (2)
4 and reported via to the
subjects via their computer screens.  At the end of 22 periods, subjects were paid their
accumulated payoffs (converted from laboratory dollars to Canadian dollars at a rate common to
all participants that was announced at the beginning of the session).
Two information conditions were used.  In incomplete information environments subjects
had no information about the incomes and payoff tables of other group members. In complete
information environments they also knew both the incomes and payoff tables (preferences) of the-8-
other people in their group.  In all cases subjects knew their own incomes, payoff tables, the
identity of the other individuals in their group and when the session would end. 
Four heterogeneity treatments were employed: a base line homogeneity treatment in which
all subjects had the same endowments and same preferences (SE/SP), heterogeneity in income but
not preferences (DE/SP), heterogeneity in preferences but not income (SE/DP), and heterogeneity
in both income and preferences (DE/DP)  Income heterogeneity was induced by changing the
distribution of income from L$20 to each subject to L$18 to two subjects and L$24 to one
subject.  Heterogeneity in preferences was induced by changing the  s from {9, 9, 9} to {6, 6, "i
15}.  When heterogeneity was introduced in both income and preferences the subject who was
endowed with the high income was also given the stronger preference for the public good.  In all
treatments, the group income,  , was L$60 per period and the aggregate preference parameter W
 was 27.  The four heterogeneity treatments were replicated 3 times in each of two information "
conditions. The eight different treatments are summarized in Table 2. 
When communication was permitted, subjects with complete information were told that
they were permitted to discuss anything they wished, other than physical threats or side-payments,
for four minutes.  Subjects were also reminded that they had each others payoff tables, which they
could bring to discuss during the communication phases of the session.  They were also told that
any agreements they reached during their discussion would not be enforced by the session monitor
or by the computers.
The communication instructions in the incomplete information treatment were identical
with the following exception.  Subjects were permitted to share only qualitative information about     
5  Because individuals may make only integer contributions, the payoff tables associated with
the best-response functions derived from the underlying model result in multiple Nash equilibria
distributions of contributions.  These are eliminated in the payoff tables used in this experiment by
adjusting the appropriate cells in the payoff tables to insure that the Nash equilibria distributions
of contributions are unique for each of  the four heterogeneity treatments.
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their own payoffs.  They could state that a contribution pattern increased or decreased their
payoff, but value amounts could not be shared.  Recall that in these sessions subjects had only
their own payoff tables.
Seventy-two subjects in 24 groups of three participated in these public goods
environments.  Sessions were completed in less than ninety minutes.  The average compensation
for participating was $27.75 (the range was $19.00 to $43.50; standard deviation was $5.37).
IV. PREDICTIONS
If subjects’ utilities are fully captured by the induced payoffs described by the payoff
function (2), there is a unique single period Nash equilibrium for each treatment.  The equilibria
are characterized by a unique distribution of non-negative contributions across participants.
5  The
theoretical individual and group contributions are presented in Table 2 and are invariant to the
information condition.  The optimal provision of the public good requires an aggregate
contribution of L$43.  This also is invariant across treatments.  
The public good environment described above would lead self-interested non-cooperative
individuals to provide the same aggregate level of voluntary contributions towards public good
provision regardless of the heterogeneity characteristics of the environment.  This result was
supported by data reported in Chan et al. (1996) in an environment similar to the environment
described here with income heterogeneity, complete information, and no communication.-10-
The effect of communication and incomplete information is not obvious.  The theory, as
presented in the BBV environment, provides no role for communication of the form it is
introduced here.  Work by Isaac and Walker (1988) and Hackett, Schlager, and Walker (1994),
however, strongly suggests that, behaviourally, communication will lead to substantial increases in
public good provision with or without complete information.  Isaac and Walker (1988) report
laboratory results in which income heterogeneity and communication leads to a reduction of
public good provision relative to environments with income equality and communication.
Our working hypothesis is that, contrary to the predictions of non-cooperative game
theory, heterogeneity in income or preferences will affect the level of voluntary contributions,
although the direction of the effect is unknown.  Moreover, prior experimental work suggests that
communication and full  information will each increase the level of voluntary contributions.  The
nature of the interactions among these factors is not known a priori; in fact exploring the extent
and direction of these interactions is the purpose of our experiment.
  
V. RESULTS
The data from the experiment are summarized in Table 3, which reports the average per
period group contributions by treatment and phase.  The first phase of a session consists of the
first six periods during which there is no communication. The first two of these periods were
treated as practice rounds and dropped while analysing the data. The next four phases each
consist of four decision rounds following a round of communication.  Each entry in Table 3
represents the average group contribution across four periods in three sessions.  Figures 1 and 2
present the times series of group contributions to public good provision for each period of the     
6  SE indicates endowments are the same across all subjects in a group and DE indicates the
endowments are different.  SP indicates preferences are the same across all subjects in a group




The statistical results presented to support the observations below are based on
randomization tests of differences in means and on analyses of variance which use the average per
period group contribution data for each session summarized in the “periods 3-6” column and the
“periods 15-18” column in Table 3.  This provides two observations from each of the twenty-four
sessions.  Each observation from a session is collected under a different communication treatment. 
The third phase of communication rounds is selected because effects of reputation and learning in
the communication environment should have stabilized after two rounds of communication and
eight decision rounds.  The final phase of communication rounds was excluded because of
potential end-game effects (the participants knew these were the last four decision rounds).
Data from the SE/DP and DE/SP treatments (heterogeneity in preferences or
heterogeneity in incomes) reported in Table 3 were pooled after conducting an analysis of
variance which indicated that the effects of treatments SE/DP and DE/SP were not significantly
different from one another (p = 0.573 for accumulated tests of differences in coefficients
corresponding to SE/DP and DE/SP and all relevant interaction terms).
6   The data are further
summarized in Table 4 in which the Heterogeneous Income or Preferences treatment pools the
SE/DP and DE/SP data and the Heterogeneous Income and Preferences treatment includes the
DE/DP data.  The results of the analysis of variance which is ultimately used to characterize the
data from this experiment are reported in Table 5.-12-
Observations based on these data are grouped in the same order as the hypotheses are
grouped in the previous section.
Observation 1: Communication increases coordination.
Figures 1 and 2 provide visual evidence of the impact of communication on voluntary
contributions to the public good.  For each of the eight heterogeneity/information treatments there
is a clear tendency for contributions to be greater during the last four phases than in the first
phase.  A comparison of the simple means of the twenty-four “no communication” observations
(22.23) and the twenty-four “communication” observations (34.99) summarized in Table 4
indicates that they are significantly different (randomization test, p = 0.000).  This result is further
supported by the analysis of variance result reported in Table 5, which shows that the main effect
of communication is significant (p = 0.000).  There is a significant interaction between
communication and heterogeneity (p=0.002).  However Table 4 shows that mean contributions
with communication exceed mean contributions without communication under each of the three
hetereogeneity categories. ￿  
Observation 2: Incomplete information decreases coordination in homogeneous
environments.
Mean contributions in the complete information condition (29.71) exceed mean contributions in
the incomplete information condition (27.51).  Analysis of variance shows that this main effect is
significant (p = 0.073). The interaction between incomplete information and communication is not
significant (p = 0.434).  The interaction between incomplete information and hetereogeneity is
weakly significant (p = 0.106).  Inspection of Table 4 shows that mean contributions in-13-
homogeneous environments with incomplete information (21.92) are much less than mean
contributions in homogeneous environments with complete information (29.80).  A randomization
test shows this difference is significant ( p = 0.071).  Mean contributions in heterogeneous
environments do not differ much across information conditions (means of 30.00 and 30.07 for
one-dimensional heterogeneity and 29.04 and 28.00 for two-dimensional heterogeneity).  Neither
difference is significant on a randomization test (p = 0.506 and p = 0.399 respectively).
Consequently, while we reject the null of no effect of information in favour of the alternative of
some effect, the strength of the result is based on the impact of incomplete information in
homogeneous environments. ￿ 
Observation 3: Heterogeneity increases coordination when information is
incomplete.
Mean contributions in the homogenous environment (25.86) are distinctly lower that the mean
contributions in either the one-dimensional or the two-dimensional heterogeneity environments
(30.04 and 28.52, respectively).  Analysis of variance shows this main effect of heterogeneity is
marginally significant (p = 0.093).  There is a weakly significant interaction between heterogeneity
and incomplete information (p = 0.106).  With complete information, there is little difference in
average voluntary contributions (29.80, 30.00, and 29.04 for homogeneous,  one-dimensional 
heterogeneous, two-dimensional heterogeneous environments respectively).  Under incomplete
information, contributions in the one-dimensional heterogeneous environments exceed those in
homogeneous environments by more than thirty-five percent (30.07 versus 21.92 respectively). 
This difference is statistically significant (randomization test, p = 0.045).   Mean contributions in
the two-dimensional heterogenous environments exceed those in homogeneous environments by-14-
more than twenty-five percent (28.00 versus 21.92 respectively).  This difference is statistically
significant (randomization test, p = 0.019). ￿
Observation 4: Communication reverses the relative importance of one- and two-
dimensional hetereogeneity.
The interaction of communication and heterogeneity is strongly significant (analysis of
variance, p = 0.002).    With no communication, mean contributions in homogeneous and one-
dimensional heterogeneous environments (20.46 and 20.94, respectively)  are noticeably less than
mean contributions in two-dimensional heterogeneous environments (26.58). The difference
between the two-dimensional heterogeneity treatment and the pooled data from the other two
treatments  is significant (randomization test, p = 0.010).  However, with communication, the
mean contributions in homogeneous environments and two-dimensional heterogeneous
environments are scarcely distinguishable (31.25 and 30.44, respectively) while mean
contributions in the one-dimensional heterogeneous environments are distinctly higher at 39.13.  
The difference between the means of the one-dimensional heterogenenous contributions and the
remaining contributions is significant (randomization test, p = 0.001). ￿ 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the effect of heterogeneity on public goods provision  under
alternative communication and information conditions.  Our work on income heterogeneity is
related to that of  Isaac and Walker (1988) and Hackett, Schlager, and Walker (1994).  Our work
on preference heterogeneity is new.  We have shown that heterogeneity in income or preferences
tends to increase public goods contributions.  The  effect is greatest when information is-15-
incomplete in the sense that subjects do not know each other’s payoffs.  The nature of the effect is
complex.  In particular we found that communication reverses  the relative importance of  one-
and two-dimensional heterogeneity in promoting cooperation. It is worth noting, however, that
our experimental design is unable to separate the effects of communication from those of learning
over the course of the session.
Table 6 compares some of our results to the Isaac and Walker (IW) and Hackett, Schlager
and Walker (HSW) papers.  Our laboratory environment differs from both of these studies in a
number of important respects.  We and IW investigate voluntary contributions to a public good
while HSW investigate appropriations from an open-access resource.  The IW payoffs are linear
in individual contributions; ours are decreasing in individual contributions, hence we have an non-
cooperative equilibrium in the interior of the contribution space.  We used groups of three
subjects while IW used groups of four and HSW used groups of eight.  Communication in the IW
and HSW sessions was allowed before each decision period while we allowed subjects the
opportunity to communicate before each block of four decision periods. Nevertheless, it is
instructive to compare the results of the three studies.
 Table 6 summarizes comparative evidence on heterogeneity and information effects in the
three studies.  Unreported in Table 6 is the common conclusion of all three studies that non-
binding communication is positively related to group contributions. Both IW and HSW find
strongly positive and significant effects of communication.  Our results confirm these in a related
but different environment.  Our finding of a positive effect of heterogeneity contrasts strongly
with Isaac’s and Walker’s negative effect.  Our finding is consistent, however, with the Hackett et
al. data which also display a positive effect of heterogeneity, although the authors do not-16-
emphasize this finding.
The positive effect of heterogeneity may be interpreted as supporting the sociological
literature, cited above, which argues that heterogeneity will increase public goods provision.  
This literature suggests that heterogeneity may generate environments with a critical mass of
contributors who find it in their interest to contribute to the group activity regardless of what
others contribute.  This leads the group to contribute more than would be contributed if the group
was homogeneous.  In the laboratory environments created for this experiment there are no such
critical masses.  Even so, heterogeneous group contributions exceed those of homogeneous
groups.
There are many directions to go with these results.  First, questions remain about the
pattern of giving by the individuals with lower incomes and the individuals who did not value the
public good as intensely as others.  The patterns of coordination which developed have yet to be
studied.  Did people choose to contribute equally to the provision of the public good or in
proportion to income?  What kinds of allocation rules evolved when heterogeneity was in
preferences rather than income?  Finally, new experiments could be run to study the impact of
group size on voluntary contributions to public goods in incomplete information environments.
Perhaps the most pressing need is to resolve the apparent discrepancy between the results of the
Isaac and Walker study on the one hand and the results of the Hackett et al. and present studies
on the other.-17-
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TABLE 1
DECISION AND COMMUNICATION ROUNDS
Period Numbers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
x x x x x x C x x x x C x x x x C x x x x C x x x x
Note: C identifies a round of communication and x identifies a decision round.-19-
TABLE 2
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: PARAMETERIZATION, NASH EQUILIBRIA
AND SESSIONS PER TREATMENT
Same Income
(wi = 20 for i = 1, 2, 3)
Different Income
(wi = 18 for i = 1 and 2, w3 = 24)
Same Preferences
(" "i = 9
for i = 1, 2, 3)
Different
Preferences
(" "i = 6 for i = 1 and
2, " "3 = 15)
Same
Preferences
(" "i = 9
for i = 1, 2, 3) 
Different
Preferences
(" "i = 6 for i = 1














gi = 4 for i = 1 and
 2, g3 = 13
21
3
gi = 5 for i = 1 and
 2, g3 = 11
21
3
gi = 2 for i = 1 and






3 3 3 3
Note: The parameters identified above are the subject’s preference parameter for the public good, "i, and the
subject’s endowment of income for each decision round, wi.  If the value of either of these parameters increases,
then the subject’s return to public good consumption or the subject’s endowment in each decision round
increases.  Also note that the Nash equilibria contributions are independent of the information condition.-20-
TABLE 3
AVERAGE PER PERIOD GROUP CONTRIBUTIONS
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Note: SE indicates endowments are the same across all subjects in a group and DE indicates the endowments
are different.  SP indicates preferences are the same across all subjects in a group and DP indicates preferences
are different.  The underlying parameters are given in Table 1.  Each cell in the table represents the average
group contribution across four periods in three sessions.-21-
TABLE 4
AVERAGE PER PERIOD GROUP CONTRIBUTIONS
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Note: Homogeneous sessions have the SE and SP conditions, Heterogeneous Income or Preferences sessions
have either DE or DP but not both, and Heterogeneous Income and Preferences sessions have both  DE and DP
conditions.-22-
TABLE 5
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS FOR AVERAGE PER PERIOD
GROUP CONTRIBUTIONS
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob>F
Model
Heterogeneity (H)
     Homogeneous Income and             
             Preferences
     Heterogeneous Preferences             
         or Income
     Heterogeneous Preferences             



































Notes: The analysis of variance was conducted with 48 observations.  The mean squared error is 5.26.  The R-
squared is 0.715 and the adjusted R-squared is 0.657.  The interaction terms C*II and H*C*II were dropped
from the analysis of variance which used the complete set of interactions.  The p-values for these two
interactions were 0.434 and 0.794 respectively.-23-
TABLE 6
COMPARISON WITH RESULTS OF RELATED STUDIES
Results (direction and significance)
Effect/Other Study/Description Other Study Present Study 
Heterogeneity Effect
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one-dimensional
heterogeneity



























negative, never significant negative, significant due to
strong effect in
homogeneous environment




















a.  Observation 6, Isaac and Walker (1988).  Four person groups.  
b.  Analysis of variance conducted by present authors from data presented in Tables III, IV, and VI of Hackett,
Schlager and Walker (1994), excluding the large (25 token) endowment sessions, for which the efficiencies are
significantly different from the other treatments. Non-communication results are the means of periods 1 through
5. Communication results are the means of periods 16 through 20.  Total endowment  for the groups were 80
and 128 in the homogeneous and heterogeneous cases respectively.  Dependent variable is efficiency.  Eight
person groups.





1.  Instructions for Part 1 (common to both information conditions)
General
You are participating in a study of economic decision-making.  This research is funded by several funding
agencies.  The decisions you make directly influence the money you will earn.  At the end of the session, you will
be paid in cash.  The instructions below describe the environment in which you will participate.
Introduction
The session is divided into periods.  At the beginning of each period, you are given some tokens.  There
are two markets to which you may allot your tokens.  Your token payoff is determined by how much you allot to
Market 1, and how much you and others allot to Market 2.  You need only decide how many tokens to allot to
Market 2.  Any remaining tokens will allotted to Market 1.
A payoff table has been provided for you to help you decide how much to allot to Market 2.  The table
describes your payoff in tokens based on your allotment decision to Market 2 and the decisions of others in your
group.  The numbers on this payoff table include your returns from both your Market 1 and Market 2 allotments. 
Consider the payoff table on the sheet titled EXAMPLE.  These numbers are in no way meaningful to the session
but are only introduced to help you understand how to read a payoff table.
Your possible allotment decisions are listed across the top of the table.  The combined possible allotment
decisions of the other members of your group are listed in the left-most column.  In order to read this table, you
must find your allotment decision in the top row, and move down the column until you reach the combined
allotment decision of others in your group.
Consider the case where you allot 3 tokens to Market 2 and the others in the group have a combined
allotment to Market 2 of 5 tokens.  Find the number 3 in first row.  While in this column, read down the column
until you reach the row which has 5 in the left-most column.  Here you should find the number 10.  This is your
payoff in tokens for this combination of allotments.  Please complete the questions on the EXAMPLE sheet.  Raise
your hand when you have answered the questions and a monitor will review your work and answer any questions
you may have about reading the payoff table.
The Market
At this point, please direct all further communication to the session monitor.  Information about your
decisions is to stay private.  Any questions you have will be answered if you raise your hand.
You will be linked, via computer, to two (2) other individuals in this room.  The three of you form a
group which will remain together for the session.  At the beginning of each period, you will be given some tokens. 
The computer will prompt you for your allotment decision for Market 2.  The session will have two parts.  Prior to
the start of the second part of the session a new set of instructions will be read aloud.  The rules guiding your
decision for your allotment to Market 2 during part 2 will be specified at that time.  At no time are you permitted to
allot either more tokens than your endowment or less than zero.  Any remaining tokens will be allotted to Market
1.  See SAMPLE SCREEN.  At the beginning of a period, you will receive a message on your screen concerning
your allotment to market 2 for that period.  Type a number in the square [ ] brackets and press ENTER when you
are sure you are done.  Use the BACKSPACE key to make corrections.-27-
When everyone in the room has made an allotment to Market 2 your payoff for the period will be
calculated and reported to you.  You will also see the combined allotment to Market 2 of all other individuals in
your group.  Using the information on the screen, you can verify the computer's payoff calculation by using your
payoff table.  At the end of this period, enter your information on the Record Sheet.  The Group Total on the
Record Sheet should be the sum of your allotment to Market 2 plus the allotment of Others to Market 2.  The next
period will begin, and the procedure continues as before.
Information Condition
The total token endowment for your group is 60 tokens.  Your token endowment is entered on your Record
Sheet.  Notice that the maximum allotment decision you can make to Market 2 is the token endowment entered on
your Record Sheet (in this case you invest no tokens in Market 1).  Notice that the maximum combined allotment
decisions of the other members in your group is the difference between 60 tokens and your token endowment.  The
other members of your group may have payoff tables which are different from yours.  The other members of your
group may have token endowments which are different from yours.  Information about payoffs and token
endowments is private information.
Payoffs
The conversion rate for tokens is 1 token = $0.0023 Canadian throughout the session.  For instance, if
your payoff in a particular period is 326 tokens, then your Canadian dollar earnings are 75 cents for that period. 
Again, the value 326 is completely arbitrary, and only used for the purpose of example.
There are two parts to this session, the first part lasts six (6) periods.  Before the next part, new
instructions will be distributed and read.
You will be linked, via computer, to two (2) other individuals in this room.  The three of you form a
group which will remain together for the session.  At the beginning of each period, you will be given some tokens. 
The computer will prompt you for your allotment decision for Market 2.  The session will have two parts.  Prior to
the start of the second part of the session a new set of instructions will be read aloud.  The rules guiding your
decision for your allotment to Market 2 during part 2 will be specified at that time.  At no time are you permitted to
allot either more tokens than your endowment or less than zero.  Any remaining tokens will be allotted to Market
1.  See SAMPLE SCREEN.  At the beginning of a period, you will receive a message on your screen concerning
your allotment to market 2 for that period.  Type a number in the square [ ] brackets and press ENTER when you
are sure you are done.  Use the BACKSPACE key to make corrections.
When everyone in the room has made an allotment to Market 2 your payoff for the period will be
calculated and reported to you.  You will also see the combined allotment to Market 2 of all other individuals in
your group.  Using the information on the screen, you can verify the computer's payoff calculation by using your
payoff table.  At the end of this period, enter your information on the Record Sheet.  The Group Total on the
Record Sheet should be the sum of your allotment to Market 2 plus the allotment of Others to Market 2.  The next
period will begin, and the procedure continues as before.Information Condition
The total token endowment for your group is 60 tokens.  Your token endowment is entered on your Record
Sheet.  The payoff tables are being distributed now.  Each of you will receive three payoff tables, corresponding to
the three members of your group.  The endowment of each member of your group appears as the right-most
number in the first row of each payoff table.  This number will be either 18, 20, or 24.  Notice that the maximum
allotment decision you can make for Market 2 is 18 tokens if you have an 18 token endowment, 20 tokens if you
have a 20 token endowment, or 24 tokens if you have a 24 token endowment (in each of these cases you invest no
tokens in Market 1).  Notice that the maximum combined allotment decisions of the other members of your group
is the difference between 60 tokens and your token endowment.  Please switch your payoff tables with another
person in the room.  Notice that the tables you received are exactly the same as the tables you gave up.  Your
payoff table has a letter in the top right corner which corresponds to the letter on your folder.
Payoffs
The conversion rate for tokens is 1 token = $0.0023 Canadian throughout the experiment.  For instance,
if your payoff in a particular period is 326 tokens, then your Canadian dollar earnings are 75 cents for that period. 
Again, the value 326 is completely arbitrary, and only used for the purpose of example.
There are two parts to this session, the first part lasts six (6) periods.  Before the next part, new
instructions will be distributed and read.
2.  Instructions for Part 2 (Incomplete Information Condition)
Sometimes, in previous sessions, participants have found it useful, when the opportunity arose, to
communicate with one another.  We are going to allow you this opportunity before some of the remaining periods.
You will have the opportunity to participate in sixteen (16) more periods in which you make token
allotments to Markets 1 and 2.  The environment will be identical to that of the previous six periods except you
will have an opportunity to communicate with the members of your group.  Before periods seven (7), eleven (11),
fifteen (15), and nineteen (19) you will have an opportunity to meet with the members of your group.  There will be
some restrictions on your communication.
1) You may not discuss any quantitative aspects of the private information you may have on your payoff
tables.  Information on endowments may be shared but information on specific payoffs under various
conditions may not be shared; the direction in which payoffs may move are qualitative aspects of your
payoffs and may be shared (for example, you may indicate that a particular pattern of allotments may
increase or decrease your payoff, but you may not indicate that your payoff will change by (say) 373
tokens).
2) You may not discuss or make side payments or physical threats.
3) Agreements made during the communication phases of the session will not be enforced by the monitors or
the computers.
4) Meeting time will be limited to four (4) minutes, but you may return to your computer stations earlier.
Because of these restrictions on communication with one another, one of us will monitor your discussions. 
To facilitate this, communication will take place away from your computer stations, but in this room.
Remember, after you have returned to your computer stations and the next period has begun, there will be
no more communication until four decision-periods have been completed.  3.  Instructions for Part 2 (Full Information Condition)
Sometimes, in previous sessions, participants have found it useful, when the opportunity arose, to
communicate with one another.  We are going to allow you this opportunity before some of the remaining periods.
You will have the opportunity to participate in sixteen (16) more periods in which you make token
allotments to Markets 1 and 2.  The environment will be identical to that of the previous six periods except you
will have an opportunity to communicate with the members of your group.  Before periods seven (7), eleven (11),
fifteen (15), and nineteen (19) you will have an opportunity to meet with the members of your group.  There will be
some restrictions on your communication.
1) You may not discuss or make side payments or physical threats.
2) Agreements made during the communication phases of the session will not be enforced by the monitors or
the computers.
3) Meeting time will be limited to four (4) minutes, but you may return to your computer stations earlier.
Because of these restrictions on communication with one another, one of us will monitor your discussions. 
To facilitate this, communication will take place away from your computer stations, but in this room.
Remember, after you have returned to your computer stations and the next period has begun, there will be
no more communication until four decision-periods have been completed.  -30-
4.   Example Payoff Sheet
EXAMPLE
Sample Payoff
Allotment Decisions to Market 2
Your Allotment
0 1 2 3 4 5
Combined
Allotment
   of
 Others
0 2  3 4 6 5 2
1 3 4 6 8 6 4
2 4 5 8 3 7 8
3 5 6 10  15 8  11
4 6 7 12  11 9 7
5 3 6 9 10 8 6
6 4 5 8 9 7 5
7 3 4 6 8 6 4
8 2 3 3 7 5 3
9 1 2 1 4 4 2
Questions
1)  What is your payoff if you allot 0 tokens to Market 2 and the combined allotment of others to Market 2 is 7
tokens?
Answer:
2)  If you allot 3 tokens to Market 2, and one of the other players allots 2 tokens, while the other allots 4, what is
your payoff?
Answer: